



INDIA
भारत

**India's Explanation of Vote (POST-VOTING)
Nuclear Weapons Cluster
80 UNGA First Committee, UNHQ, New York, November 2025**

Thank you, Chair,

I will explain India's votes, post-voting, on the resolutions under the Nuclear Cluster:

L.4 Steps to building a common road map towards a world without nuclear weapons

Chair,

India has abstained on the resolution L.4.

India acknowledges that Japan, the lead sponsor, is the only country to have suffered nuclear weapon use. We share the resolution's aspiration of nuclear disarmament. India remains committed to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

India also supports call for good-faith negotiations on a future nuclear arms control framework by the States with the largest nuclear arsenals in line with SSOD-1.

India has abstained on OP5 and OP6. India supports the commencement of negotiations on FMCT in the CD on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. However, India believes that the moratoria on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, is by its very nature voluntary, reversible and not verifiable, unlike an FMCT which will impose a treaty obligation and will be verifiable and irreversible.

India has not joined INFCIRC/549. India's obligations in respect of IAEA safeguards of fissile material are contained in India's specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA contained in INFCIRC/754 and an additional protocol contained in INFCIRC/754/Add 6.

While India remains committed to fully implementing these agreements, it does not recognize additional obligations or commitments in respect of safeguards or management of fissile material, beyond the scope of the two documents.

India's views on CTBT are well known, on account of which we have voted against OP7. However, I want to reiterate that India continues to maintain a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing.

L.56 Possible risks of integration of AI in NC3 systems of nuclear weapons

Chair,

On L.56, India acknowledges that the use of AI in the military domain poses ethical, legal and security concerns. We are committed to addressing these challenges.

India acknowledges that the use of AI in NC3 raises questions.

India's position is that decisions to use nuclear weapons would be taken by humans.

AI in NC3 is a very complex subject and requires further deliberation, including about concepts on which there is lack of common understanding and interpretation.

India also believes that AI could potentially have positive effects in enhancing NC3.

Further, a technology, as a whole, should not be stigmatized.

India was, therefore, constrained to abstain on the resolution L.56.

L.57: Modalities of the 2026 UN Meeting on Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation

Chair,

On L.57, India shares the sentiment embodied by the sponsors of the resolution.

India has participated in the four meetings on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and supported relevant resolutions on the issue in multilateral forums. Our approach is premised on the shared notion of the serious threat to survival of humankind that could be posed by the use of nuclear weapons.

However, we would re-iterate, like we did last year, that the parent resolution does not sufficiently differentiate between the impacts of the use and testing of nuclear weapons, nor between the different kinds of tests that have been conducted.

India was, therefore, constrained to abstain on the resolution.

L.59: GSTE on NDV

Chair,

On L.59, India supports furthering work on nuclear disarmament verification and has also supported the idea of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts and has therefore voted in favour of the resolution.

We have, however, a number of concerns on this resolution.

India believes that the GSTE should be subsidiary to the Conference on Disarmament, which has the right mandate, membership, rules of procedure, as well as the experience, to supervise technical work on verification.

India called a vote on OP1 because of concerns about the manner in which this Group is proposed to be constituted. Given the nature of the issue of nuclear disarmament, we believe that expert work relating to nuclear disarmament verification should be undertaken by Governmental Experts.

India called a vote on OP4 because India believes that a GSTE should work on the basis of consensus.

India called vote on OP5 and OP6, because the scope and program of work of the proposed GSTE requires further deliberation, and should not be prejudged. An overly detailed program of work, leaving little or no room for the scientific and technical experts, will be counter-productive.
