CD Plenary Discussion on Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices — Remarks by Ambassador Hamid Ali Rao of India, 3 February 2011
Mr. President,
India has had a consistent position on FMCT since 1993, when India joined as one of the original co-sponsors of UNGA resolution 48/75L, which envisaged a fissile material cut-off treaty as a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. India had joined consensus on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on an FMCT in 1995 and then again in 1998. We also did not stand in the way of consensus on the adoption of CD/1864 which inter alia established a working group in May 2009 to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein.
In this regard I would like to recall and reiterate our plenary statement of 29 May 2009.
Further as highlighted in our previous plenary statements, India attaches importance to the CD as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and its rules of procedure, especially the rule of consensus. We believe that the CD is the appropriate forum for negotiating the FMCT. We expect the CD to negotiate instruments of universal application. It is therefore essential that all relevant countries participate in the negotiations and contribute to their successful outcome. For its part, India, as a country possessing nuclear weapons, is willing to conclude a universal, non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is obvious that the Treaty would have to meet India's national security interests.
Mr. President,
We believe that a future FMCT must be non-discriminatory, in that the obligations and responsibilities arising from the Treaty must apply in a non-discriminatory manner to all States Parties to the Treaty, in particular, States directly affected by its obligations and responsibilities. We also believe that verification will be an important element of the Treaty's architecture. Any verification mechanism that is acceptable to all should meet the criteria of being effective and the treaty itself should be internationally verifiable.
We also believe that the FMCT must be a Treaty for banning the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We see this as the main characteristic in defining the scope of the Treaty. If implemented in good faith through universal participation and adherence, an FMCT would be significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects-the objective conceived and envisaged in the common understandings leading to the 1993 UNGA Resolution.
Mr. President, we have listened carefully to assertions that certain developments outside the competence of this forum would accentuate asymmetries in stocks and have thus affected the prospects for an FMCT. We do not agree with this reasoning. As we all know the real reasons are different. How many asymmetries can we fix? Asymmetries in size and development do not and should not prevent us from working together in multilateral forums. Further, contrary to what has been said, India's membership in international export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) strengthens international non-proliferation efforts. We have to be careful about who seeks to be the conscience keeper of the international non-proliferation regime.
To conclude, there is no change in India's support for commencement of negotiations in the CD on a fissile material cut-off treaty or FMCT. We have participated with an open mind in informal and plenary discussions on the FMCT in previous years, including last year. As we stated at our last plenary on 1 February, we believe that such discussions are without prejudice to the priority that should be accorded to the adoption of a programme of work for undertaking substantive work, including negotiations in the CD. They cannot be a substitute for FMCT negotiations in a subsidiary body established by a formal decision of the CD nor can they be cited as a precedent or as a reflection of the substantive positions of delegations during negotiations.
