Comments on Measures on S&T in the Rolling Text

Chair,

The rapid developments in S&T are having a profound impact on the landscape of bio-sciences. These developments have brought forth deep implications for the Convention and its sustainability.

The threats in the context of our Convention have increased significantly in recent years, given the availability and affordability of sophisticated biotechnology tools, and a marked reduction in the costs of sequencing and synthesis.

Likewise, the convergence of biosciences with emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, and robotics have paved way for applications of biosciences and technologies that are easier, cheaper, faster, and more accessible.

These developments offer unprecedented opportunities, including ways of furthering the Convention’s aims, however, they are also outpacing the capacity of existing frameworks, both normative and governance, to manage the new risks, including the potential of accentuating risks relating to proliferation and security.

Chair,

With regard to the Rolling Text, the measures contained under Section B, we would like to underline the following:-

We welcome the proposals, as outlined in Para 6 to 13, and are willing to consider them.

We need to consider if and how these proposals could be subsumed within the S&T mechanism, in order to avoid creating structures or programs, which could benefit from secretarial support, mandated under the S&T mechanism.

Para 8, to 13, in our view, are the functions or the mandate of the S&T mechanism. Some of these functions would be those of limited ended group. Others, which would require contributions of all, would be those of Open-ended Group.

Para 6 could be split in two parts, one that focusses on a possible code of conduct, and the second on education and awareness raising.

On the reference to Tianjin Bio-security guidelines, we would like to note that it is a work of input from experts from few countries, and not the work of the BWC membership.

However, we are willing to support a reference to Tianjin Bio-security Guidelines, encouraging States to draw from these guidelines, or any others that may exist, in line with their distinct national contexts.

We support para 7. While we learn from work done in other related international organisations, we underline the need to avoid duplication, even, taking into account the mandate of BWC.

We would also be open to inserting a new paragraph that underlines how developing countries stand to benefit from S&T mechanism, and its advisory outcomes, particularly in the realm of responsible life-sciences research.

Thank you.