Statement by India on Compliance and Verification, during the 6^th session of the Working Group on Strengthening BTWC, 19^th August 2025

Chair,

My delegation underscores that compliance and verification are central to strengthening and institutionalising our Convention. Rapid advances in biosciences, together with the COVID-19 pandemic, have exposed our vulnerability to catastrophic biological events.

There remains a significant gap between what has been achieved and what could be accomplished on compliance and verification. India has consistently called for negotiating concrete measures. After an impasse of more than 25 years, we must acknowledge how biosciences and technology continue to reshape the threat landscape, creating new pathways for activities inconsistent with the BWC.

We have a few observations on the Section D of the Rolling Text that you have proposed.

We are examining the paper; we do not have specific textual edits but have more like general observations.

We welcome your proposal to establish the OEWG.

Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the rolling text, in what appears to us, outline the purposes of verification, which includes “building confidence”, “deterring non-compliance”, and “providing timely and credible evidence of compliance and non-compliance”. In our view, these objectives must be clearly defined and harmonised, since different purposes demand different levels of scrutiny.

Similarly, we need clarity on the target of verification: whether it is any illicit bioactivity at any time, or significant unusual activities over the long term.

At this stage, a less detailed, more open-ended approach, as suggested by some delegations, may be better suited for facilitating consensus. In this regard, we would simply suggest trimming down details in para 23.

Going forward, we must examine how biosciences, biotechnology, and related facilities shape verification, and how S&T advancements create both opportunities and challenges. We are particularly interested in how future verification efforts can address threats from illicit actors and terrorists.

Previous work under VEREX, the Ad Hoc Group, and the UNDC’s 1988 principles provide useful guidance, but important questions remain: whether traditional verification models apply in the biological context, whether reliance on lists and thresholds is feasible, or whether qualitative approaches may be more appropriate.

Verification must be applied equally and non-discriminatorily to all States Parties. The current Article VI is contrary to this spirit, and in our view, would require amendment.

For long-term sustainability, measures must be anchored in legally binding agreements. A science-based approach is essential, including the ability to distinguish natural outbreaks from deliberate incidents. Industry engagement, exploration of managed access techniques, and designing verification as part of a multi-layered and mutually reinforcing system of measures will be crucial.

Chair,

Lastly, we stress that the OEWG must function on the basis of consensus. Verification should focus on the negative obligations of the Convention. CBMs, while important, have a separate mandate and cannot substitute for declarations, which must remain at the core of verification.

Thank you.

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