Statement by India at the Fourth Session of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 22nd August 2024, Geneva Statement by India at the Fourth Session of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 22nd August 2024, Geneva

Statement by India at the Fourth Session of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 22nd August 2024, Geneva

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, for giving me the floor.

Chair,

The rapid developments in science and technology are having a profound impact on the landscape of bio-sciences. These developments have brought forth deep implications for the Convention and its sustainability.

The threats in the context of BTWC have been increasing significantly in recent years, given the availability and affordability of sophisticated biotechnology tools, and a marked reduction in the costs of sequencing and synthesis.

Likewise, the convergence of biosciences with emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, and robotics have paved way for applications of biosciences and technologies that are easier, cheaper, faster, and more accessible.

These developments offer unprecedented opportunities, including ways of furthering the Convention’s aims, however, they are also outpacing the capacity of existing frameworks, both normative and governance, to manage the new risks, including the potential of accentuating risks relating to proliferation and security.

Chair,

Any regulatory framework, that we envision to design for the Convention, will increasingly have to factor the cross-cutting implications of the underlying technological revolution.

The Article XII of the Convention provides for a review of new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. However, in the context of BTWC, we do not as of yet,have a structured toolto review such developments, which has also left a gap in the Convention.

India has, therefore, underlined the need for BTWC to have a structured scientific advisory process. The 9th Review Conference also had decided to develop with a view to establishing a mechanism to review and assess scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

We positively note the intensification of recent efforts within our convention on the issue. Last year, we heard concrete proposals from several delegations, on the possible structure of such a scientific review mechanism.

These proposals have received a serious consideration from my delegation.

Chair,

My delegation believes that our discussions will benefit from a more pointed deliberation on the mandate, modalities, structure, composition, financing and outputs of such a mechanism.

We take note of the non-paper produced by the Friends of Chair, which has proposed draft elements for the establishment of such a mechanism.

We would like to briefly outline our understanding on what a structured S&T review mechanism could possibly look like: -

  • The mandate of the S&T Review Mechanism must be consistent with the object and the purpose of the Convention. It should be clearly distinguished from scientific advisory processes in other relevant IOs focusing on biosecurity and biosafety.
  • It should, amongst other relevant issues, consider evolving nature of threats including one that emanates from non-state actors.
  • The scientific review mechanism, in our view, must be a technical body. It is essential to maintain the independence of the mechanism to preserve its credibility and long-term value.
  • The mechanism should be open to all State Parties. A hybrid approach, with both open ended and limited groupings will bring balance to the S&T Mechanism. The open-ended group will likely help in preserving inclusivity. A limited-ended grouping will preserve agility.
  • Composition of the limited-ended body should reflect broad geographical distribution and based on a clear and transparent criterion for the selection of the members.
  • The outputs of the mechanism could be characterized as “assessments”, which is a wider terminology, that could encompass findings and recommendations, as also commentary on relevant issues.
  • The open body should also be able to deliberate, and if possible, review and comment on the assessments produced by the limited ended body.
  • The mechanism should be provided with adequate and predictable financial and personnel resources. This will also help to reinforce independence of the mechanism.
  • The specific issues for assessments could take into account overall guidance from the Review Conference.
  • Decision making for deriving assessments can follow the model of Scientific Advisory Board in OPCW.
  • The mechanism should seek to leverage S&T advisory mechanisms in other relevant IOs to synergize the complementarities that exist and avoid overlaps.

Chair,

We look forward to listening to other delegations about their views about the mechanism and its various elements.

We also take note of the view expressed yesterday that consensus building on the mechanism and its elements, will inevitably get linked with progress in other areas of the Convention and that the development of Convention should take place in a comprehensive and balanced manner.

I thank you.